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Abstract
National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to se-
nior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60 year period, the
nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly
the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which
nations are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics corre-
late with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are
small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Statistically, democracy, investment
in diplomacy, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions|even
after controlling for the U.N. stang mandate of competence and integrity. National
control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the inuence of the
United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In
spite of the decline in U.S. inuence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to
the world at large.
We are grateful to Uggi Lee, Daniel Lim, Vikram Viswanathan, and Edward Zhong for diligent research
assistance. Kristy Buzard, Michael Clemens, Christina Davis, Je Friedman, Julia Gray, Diego Hernandez,
Tana Johnson, Peter Katzenstein, Michael Levi, Beth Simmons, Ian Tomb, several sta members of the
United Nations, and in particular Ilyana Kuziemko provided helpful input, comments and suggestions,
as did seminar participants at Columbia University, the Political Economy of International Organizations
conference at Princeton and the Economics of National Security meeting at NBER. The rst stage of data
gathering for this project was funded by the National Bureau of Economic Research's Economics of National
Security program to Kuziemko and Werker, and Werker thanks the Harvard Business School Division of
Research and Faculty Development for continuing support. The usual disclaimer applies.
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This paper examines the nationality of the most senior ocials in the United Nations Sec-
retariat over the last sixty years, with the goal of understanding which nations have been
successful in controlling this institution, and what factors have allowed them to do so. There
is intense competition among nations over the stang of these positions, and once in these
positions, there is evidence that ocials act in the interests of their home nations.
Because of the contested nature and scarcity of these positions, Secretariat stang data
can be used to inform at least two signicant discussions. The most direct application is
to understand who runs the United Nations itself. While the United Nations is arguably
the world's most representative international organization, it was set up by a particular set
of nations, the victors of the second world war, with the goal of sustaining a certain kind
of world order. Our sta nationality data provide a time-varying proxy for the importance
of each nation at the United Nations. Our results suggest that the post-war balance of
control at the United Nations has been largely sustained, in spite of signicant changes in
the balance of global economic power over this time.
A second application is to treat the stang of international institutions as an outcome of
the distribution of power across nations. According to John Mearsheimer, realists maintain
that international institutions are \basically a reection of the distribution of power in the
world" (1994). There is a substantial literature on the measurement of power (Nye, 2011b),
and a vigorous debate on whether power is even measurable (Guzzini, 2013). By identifying
the distribution of positions in the Secretariat, we provide an objective measure across all
nations of a zero-sum dimension of power, the power to control international institutions
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Barnett and Duvall, 2005), that appears to be of signicant
concern to governments around the world. This method of comparing power across nations
addresses some of the critiques in the literature on the empirical measurement of power,
2particularly the critique that a focus on military capability is too narrow in scope. Our
approach therefore brings together two traditions of scholarship that are usually seen as
incongruent: the measurement of power, and the treatment of power as multidimensional.
The Secretariat is staed by nationals of the United Nations' 193 member states. In
theory, the Secretariat is to be staed according to the competence and integrity of individual
candidates, with an additional mandate of achieving broad representation of nations, but in
practice the top positions are highly contested in an intensely political process. The struggle
for inuence over the appointment of the most recent Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, was
widely covered, with China's growing global inuence an important factor in the selection
of a candidate from Asia (Thant and Scott, 2007). Ban's appointed top management team
was, according to the Financial Times, \dominated by ocials from powerful countries"
(2007). Among them was then-U.S. ambassador to Indonesia Lynn Pascoe who was to head
the political aairs department despite other countries' objections that he was \a State
Department guy" (Turner, 2007). Three years later, when Briton and former Blair cabinet
member Valerie Amos was appointed under-secretary general for humanitarian aairs, a
source to the Guardian newspaper observed: \This is a massively signicant job, one of
the top ve at the U.N. [...] It would be unthinkable for Britain not to have one of the
top ve jobs" (Watt, 2010). Competition over other high-level positions occurs blatantly as
governments support the candidacy of their own nationals (The Economist, 1989).
Once secure in their position, sta have the ability to inuence aairs in the interests of
their home nation. The United Nations reported in its own newsletter, \The United Nations
has increasingly become a political arena where high ocials engage in political give-and-
take and where `interest groups' lobby for their country's interests... Political appointees are
frequently not loyal to the United Nations, but to their respective governments, upon which
they depend for further reward or punishment" (Finger and Hanan, 1980). Informal spheres
of national control appear to be a feature of many international institutions, including the
3European Commission and NATO (Kleine, 2013), and increasing evidence suggests that
the national identities of bureaucrats aect the decision-making of institutions (Kaja and
Werker, 2010; Johns, 2007).
We assembled data on the most senior positions in the Secretariat (approximately 80 out
of some 43,000 total sta members today, United Nations 2012), as published in the U.N.
Yearbook from 1947-2007. We researched the nationalities of these senior ocials to generate
time series data on the countries controlling the executive arm of the United Nations. This
dataset allows us to analyze how positions are allocated, and to use the allocation of positions
as a window into the inuence, or power, of states in the international system.
We introduce the notion of \excess representation" in the Secretariat, which is the number
of senior Secretariat positions held by a country, over and above what would be expected if
positions were held in proportion to countries' populations. Ranking countries by excess rep-
resentation, we nd that the top positions are dominated by rich democracies: the ve most
overrepresented countries in the Secretariat are Sweden, Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and
Ireland. The United States is overrepresented, and China is signicantly underrepresented.
We then test for the factors that predict a country's representation in the Secretariat. We
rst model the stang mandate of the United Nations, which requires sta to be selected on
criteria of competence and integrity, with some regard for equal geographical distribution.
We proxy competence with the national stock of university graduates and integrity with a
measure of freedom from corruption. Both variables are signicant predictors in the expected
direction, as is the assessment of dues to the United Nations. We next examine additional
factors, including total GDP, per capita wealth, military spending, investment in diplomacy,
and democracy. With the inclusion of these additional variables, we nd that diplomacy,
wealth, GDP and democracy are all signicant predictors of inuence.1 The most robust of
1As we describe in the results, it is dicult to disentangle military expenditure, human capital, assessment
of dues to the United Nations and GDP, because they are so highly correlated with each other. We report
this result as GDP not because we think GDP is a more important factor than the other three, but because
4these is diplomacy, suggesting that countries can invest in institutional power in a manner
that is at least partially orthogonal to military investment and economic power. Conditional
on that investment, rich countries and democracies are more successful in exerting their
power overseas.
We extend our method to take alliances between nations into account. If two countries
have similar preferences over international policies, they may benet from having each other
in powerful positions. In order to capture the direct and indirect power (i.e. power held by
allies) of a country, we construct a measure of national inuence that takes into account the
similarity of preferences to other inuential nations, as proxied by similarity of U.N. General
Assembly voting records (Gartzke, 1998).2
Finally, we use these measures to describe the inuence of the United States in the Sec-
retariat over the last 60 years. We nd that the share of Americans in senior positions has
been declining since the 1960s. These senior positions have not been replaced by growing
middle income countries, but by citizens of other rich democracies. While the world popu-
lation share of Western Europe and its oshoots fell from 18% in 1965 to 13% in 2005, their
share of Secretariat positions remained largely constant, falling from 46% in 1965 only to
45% in 2005.
If American and European ideologies were the same as they were in 1950, the United
States would not have experienced any real loss of inuence at the Secretariat, as its lost
positions were taken up by its 1950 allies. However, by our measures, the ideologies of the
United States and its 1950 allies have diverged, especially since the 1980s, so the placement
of old allies in former U.S. positions has led to a substantial loss in American inuence at
the United Nations.
These ndings both reinforce and add nuance to Keohane's 1984 notion that international
it is the most commonly used proxy for the large set of indicators highly correlated with GDP.
2The methodology supports measures of alliance other than voting anity, such as common membership
in intergovernmental organizations. The latter yields broadly similar results in our applications.
5institutions can outlast the circumstances determining their creation. The United Nations
Secretariat continues to reect the membership of the U.S.-led alliance that was instrumental
in its creation, in spite of that alliance's declining economic and military dominance of the
world. But it no longer represents American ideology; American control over the United
Nations is now constrained by the allies with which it built the institution.
These ndings|as well as the broader methodology of measuring the outcome of diplo-
matic struggle by looking at stang outcomes|contribute to the extensive literature on
power in international relations (reviewed in Baldwin 2013).
The search for objective measures of power that were comparable across nations goes back
at least to the eighteenth century (Gulick 1955, cited in Baldwin 2013). These capability-
based measures became ever more complex, as reected in Morgenthau (1948), culminating in
Cline's formula (1975), which was a nonlinear combination of population, territory, income,
energy, minerals, manufacturing, food, trade, as well as strategy and will. Cline's measure
was used by the U.S. army among others to estimate long run trends in national capabilities
(Tellis et al., 2000).
The capability-based approach has been critiqued by scholars across a number of dis-
ciplines, who argue that power is situationally specic and relational and therefore \not
objectively measurable"(Guzzini, 2009). Contrary to the analysts who count national man-
power and resources, Guzzini argues that power is not fungible; what generates power in one
context may not generate power in another. For example, U.S. military resources may not
be usable against friends as they would be against enemies.
A key development in this literature over the last half century has been the description
and categorization of dierent types of power, including the well-known \faces of power"
debate. Dahl's 1957 seminal study dened a notion of compulsory power as the ability of
A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argued
that there was a second face of power: the ability to set the agenda. Lukes (1974) added
6a third face: the ability to inuence others' initial preferences. More recently, Barnett and
Duvall (2005)'s typology suggests four faces of power. While the traditional capability-
based approach is well captured by the idea of compulsory power, control over the stang
of international institutions is closer to Barnett and Duval's Institutional and Productive
Powers: rst, the ability to control actors through their diuse interactions in institutions,
and second, the ability to inuence \systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad
and general social scope" (Barnett and Duvall, 2005), a fair description of the Secretariat's
global agenda-setting role.
With reference to Guzzini (2009), the extent to which an institution like the United
Nations shapes the capabilities of nations at all is in itself an outcome of the distribution of
state power; while our paper does not directly address this aspect of power, the distribution
of inuence within the United Nations remains an important arena of struggle, even if it
takes place within a particular structural context that is also of interest.
Analyzing U.N. Secretariat positions may appear similar to the largely realist approach of
ranking states according to their ability to exert compulsory power. However, the association
in the literature between empirical measures of power and the focus on compulsory power is
largely due to the absence of appropriate empirical measures for other dimensions of power.
Multidimensional thinking about power does not obviate the value of measurement, so long
as our outcome is dened clearly.
Our scope is narrow. We focus on the realization of a single dimension of state power:
power in international institutions. We cannot predict whether one nation can exert power
over another in a general sense (e.g. in a war), and our measure is only relevant to the extent
that control over international institutions is perceived by nations as being important.
With that qualication, our method has several desirable characteristics. First, we are
measuring a global outcome that involves nearly all countries in the world, measured with
equal accuracy for all countries. Second, it is a continuous measure, available each year
7that we observe the senior sta positions in the Secretariat, allowing us to observe changes
over time. These features give researchers a new opportunity to study the expression of an
arguably increasingly important dimension of power in a panel data setting.
The main weakness of Secretariat representation as a measure of power is that countries
do not equally value the United Nations, so some will exert less eort to secure senior
positions in the organization. While the Secretariat is one of the most representative and
central institutions of the international system, it is clearly not the case that every country
puts in the same level of resources to get sta into key positions. The measure is therefore a
combination of the desire and the ability to inuence international outcomes. Nevertheless,
countries that can obtain these positions at a lower cost can be considered more powerful
(Harsanyi 1962, cited in Baldwin 2013), and they are likely to obtain more positions, all
other things equal.3
Besides the work on the United Nations and on power, this paper contributes to several
dierent literatures. One is the study of how individual nations exert inuence within in-
ternational institutions (Robert and Jacobson, 1973). Much of the recent work in this eld
focuses on the role of major powers in shaping outcomes including loans, agendas, conces-
sions, votes, or peacekeeping scope (Allen and Yuen, 2013; Kaja and Werker, 2010; Kilby,
2011; Kleine, 2013; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Stone, 2004). A
small but growing area of literature takes advantage of the unique institutional environment
of the United Nations to answer broader questions (Gartzke, 1998; Fisman and Miguel, 2007).
Finally, there is a literature on international bureaucrats (e.g. Johns 2007, Urpelainen 2012,
Johnson 2013) that has little direct crossover with this paper, but reinforces the notion that
3Independent of the preferences of governments, nationals of dierent countries may have dierent prefer-
ences regarding the desirability of UN Secretariat positions. While this could be a driver of sta composition,
it would not aect the fact that these countries would then have an outsize inuence at the UN as a result
of the preferences of their nationals. In fact, we would expect preferences of citizens toward inuencing the
UN to be correlated with the preferences of their elected governments. Finally, this eect would go in the
opposite direction of our ndings on wealth, because citizens of poor countries would likely value a secure
and well-remunerated UN position more highly than citizens of rich countries.
8international bureaucrats retain allegiance to their home countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes what the Secretariat
does and how it is staed. Section 3 explains the Secretariat position data and the empirical
specication. Section 4 reports results on the determinants of representation in the Secre-
tariat and the countries that are most overrepresented. Section 5 examines alliances, and
applies our methodology to the case of the United States. Section 6 concludes.
2 Political Economy of the United Nations Secretariat
2.1 What does the Secretariat do?
The United Nations is the primary international organization responsible for maintaining
peace and facilitating cooperation among nations to resolve issues that require collective
action. The United Nations' executive arm is the Secretariat, and it plays a key role in
agenda-setting for the various deliberative U.N. organs, as well as managing global peace-
keeping operations. The Secretariat also houses the U.N. Department of Political Aairs,
which is essentially a ministry of foreign aairs with active policy around the world.
The United Nations is organized into six major organs: (i) the General Assembly; (ii) the
Security Council; (iii) the Economic and Social Council; (iv) the defunct Trusteeship Council;
(v) the International Court of Justice; and (vi) the Secretariat. The U.N. Secretariat is the
executive arm of the United Nations. It serves the other bodies of the U.N., administers
operations initiated by those bodies, conducts surveys and research, and communicates with
non-state actors such as media and non-government organizations.
While the decision-making powers of the U.N. reside within its deliberative bodies (the
General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Security Council), the Secretariat
plays a key role in implementation and in setting the agenda for those bodies. The content
of the resolutions debated in the deliberative bodies originates in the Secretariat, and many
9of the programs are implemented by organs of the Secretariat. The Secretariat is the main
source of economic and political analysis for the General Assembly and Security Council,
and operates political eld missions which provide knowledge to those bodies.
The Secretariat prepares the technical assessments that precede peacekeeping operations
and appoints the leaders of peacekeeping operations. These Heads of Mission report directly
to an under-secretary general in the Secretariat, and the deliberative bodies have no further
role in implementation of peacekeeping operations.
Given this range of roles, the Secretariat has more decision-making power than its de
jure status as a \member to serve the other organs" suggests. In a 1955 address, Secretary
General Dag Hammerskjold described this power as follows:
The United Nations is what member nations made it, but within the limits set
by government action and government cooperation, much depends on what the
Secretariat makes it... [it] has creative capacity. It can introduce new ideas. It
can, in proper forms, take initiatives. It can put before member governments
ndings which will inuence their actions (Kelen, 1968).4
The sta of the Secretariat are ostensibly international civil servants who serve the goals
of the United Nations rather than their home countries. However, the spoken and unspoken
struggle between nations to place their nationals in senior positions at the United Nations
speaks both to the importance of this creative power of the Secretariat, as well as the
widespread belief that Secretariat sta continue to favor the interests of their home nations.
4Many were troubled by this normative view of the Secretariat, and perceived Hammerskjold as too
activist a Secretary General; upon his death, he was replaced by U Thant who was expected to guide the
Secretariat to a more subdued role. The case serves to demonstrate that nations place signicant importance
on the behavior and composition of the U.N. Secretariat.
102.2 Stang the Secretariat
2.2.1 Ocial Procedures
The Secretary General (SG) heads the United Nations Secretariat, and is selected by the
Security Council, with approval from the General Assembly. The next layer of hierarchy
consists of under-secretaries general, who are largely selected by the SG and then appointed
if approved by the General Assembly. The General Assembly also plays a signicant role
in determining the number and sphere of inuence of under-secretaries. The remaining
approximately 43,000 sta of the Secretariat are appointed by senior Secretariat ocials
without direct interaction with the deliberative bodies (Wynes and Zahran, 2011).
Appointment of Secretariat ocials is guided by two criteria stated in the Charter of the
United Nations:
The paramount consideration in the employment of the sta and in the determi-
nation of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest
standards of eciency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to
the importance of recruiting the sta on as wide a geographical basis as possible
(United Nations, 1945).
Since 1958, internal documents discussed a \desirable range" of sta that should come
from each country, a range which would be based on membership (i.e. some minimum number
of positions per country), population, and assessment of dues, with the largest weight on
assessment.5,6 These desirable ranges apply to the total stock of positions and do not consider
seniority; in practice, it has been observed that the nationality distribution of senior positions
5From about 1960 to 1975, the relative target weights on membership, population and assessment were
20%, 9%, 71%. The formula has changed several times since then; current documents suggest respective
weights of 40%, 5% and 55%.
6Membership dues owed by members of the United Nations are proportional to their GDP, with a pro-
gressive ceiling to lower the cost of membership to poor nations and limit one nation (the United States)
from paying too large a share. Many nations have failed to pay their full dues at various times; stang
formulae are based on assessment, not on actual dues paid.
11departs more signicantly from the desirable range than the distribution of all positions, a
situation which the General Assembly has on occasion discussed (Meron, 1982).
2.2.2 Unocial Jockeying
It is widely recognized that nations lobby to place their sta in senior positions in the Sec-
retariat. Indeed, there is a 600-page book on the subject, titled Politics of Stang the
United Nations Secretariat (Ameri, 1996).7 The appointment of Secretaries General, which
takes place approximately every ten years, is watched carefully by international analysts.
The selection of under-secretaries was an important arena of conict in the Cold War, and
frequently discussed in the General Assembly, with Soviets pushing for a transparent divi-
sion of powers with three under-secretaries representing respectively the Western Block, the
Eastern Block and the Non-aligned countries (Reymond, 1967). Such a division would make
more explicit the allegiance that Secretariat sta often retained to their home countries.
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence routinely published a report entitled,
\Soviet Presence in the U.N. Secretariat," (United States Senate, 1985) which claimed,
Soviets in the Secretariat function reasonably well as adjuncts of the Soviet For-
eign Ministry and intelligence services [...] The 800 Soviets assigned to the United
Nations as international civil servants report directly to the Soviet missions and
are part of an organization managed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, intelligence
services, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. [... They] are
involved in shaping conference papers, controlling the ow of news to sta and
delegations, inuencing delegations seeking Secretariat advice, and aiding Soviet
diplomats during conference and other deliberations. [...] Approximately one
fourth of the Soviets in the U.N. Secretariat are intelligence ocers and many
more are co-opted by the KGB.
7Additional references include Finger (1980) and Reymond (1967).
12The Committee Report implies that the United States did not exert the same measure
of control over Americans at the United Nations; nevertheless the importance of placing
nationals of aligned countries in senior positions is evident.
3 Data and Specications
3.1 Constructing the Database of Secretariat Positions
We compiled data on Secretariat stang from the annual Yearbook of the United Nations,
which summarizes the annual activities of all the organs of the U.N., and was published
from 1947 to 2007.8 The Appendix of the U.N. Yearbook lists the names and titles of the
most senior sta in the Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, beginning with the Secretary
General. The number of Secretariat positions listed in a given year ranges from 26 in 1950
to just over 100 in 2000.
Using the name and position of each person listed, we researched their nationality, draw-
ing on directories (such as Who's Who in the United Nations, 1975; 1992; 1951), media
articles and other historical documents. Figure 1 displays the number of positions listed
over time, along with the number of those positions for which we were able to verify the
nationality of the position-holder.9
[Figure 1 about here.]
To verify that our list accurately captured the most senior positions in the Secretariat
of the United Nations, and to rank the positions in terms of importance, we hired two
independent experts on the United Nations.10 Both experts conrmed that our list did not
8The last available copy of this publication is from 2007. It is not clear whether more recent editions are
still forthcoming or whether the United Nations has ceased publication of annual yearbooks.
9The rise in positions from 1950 to 1980 is likely inuenced by a growth in the scope of the United
Nations. However, the decline in positions listed after 2000 likely represents an editorial choice to list fewer
positions, given that the size or scope of the United Nations did not change signicantly in this period.
10Each expert had decades of experience in the U.N. system, and preferred to remain anonymous given
the potential political sensitivity of this study.
13have signicant lacunae, and independently assigned each position a weight on a scale of 1 to
6 reecting the relative importance of that position. The Secretaries General were assigned
a ranking of 6, the under-secretaries were assigned 5, and so on. Using the mean importance
rank of the two experts, we created a second measure of Secretariat representation, which
is the share of positions held by each nation in a given year, weighted by the importance of
each position held. We rescaled this measure so that it sums to one in each year.
We added several other country-year variables: (i) GDP, population and overseas devel-
opment assistance (World Development Indicators, Penn World Tables); (ii) stock of people
with tertiary education (Barro and Lee, 2012); (iii) the Worldwide Governance Indicators (of
which freedom from corruption is a component) (Kaufmann et al., 2011); (iv) the Combined
Polity Score measure of democracy from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002);
(v) state military expenditure and the Composite Index of National Capability from Cor-
relates of War v. 3.0 (Singer, 1987); and (vi) an annual count of the number of foreign
embassies operated by each country as a measure of national investment in international
diplomacy (the Diplomatic Contacts database from Rhamey et al. (2010)). Finally, we cal-
culated assessments of dues to the United Nations using data on national GDP, population,
U.N. membership and the formulae described in Section 2.2.1.
The governance measure is missing data before 1994, so we impute backward from the
earliest available year to avoid dropping a large number of observations when we include this
variable. Results on corruption are therefore more relevant in the cross section than in the
time series.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 displays summary statistics of all measures used.
143.2 Measuring Representation
3.2.1 Measuring Excess Representation
We dene a country's raw representation as the share of Secretariat positions held by that
country's nationals. We consider an alternate measure that weights each position by the
expert assessment of its importance. We dene excess representation as the ratio of a nation's
raw representation to its share of world population in a given year. Our reference point is
thus a notion of the United Nations as a kind of global democracy, with each person in the
world equally represented. If representation were \equal" in this sense, then China and India
would together control more than a third of the positions in the Secretariat, and the measure
of excess representation would be one for all countries.
3.2.2 The Stang Mandate of the United Nations and Other Factors Inuenc-
ing Representation
Two anecdotes from the early years of the United Nations (both from Ameri 1996) highlight
the challenges of achieving fair geographic coverage of top ocials. In the early years of the
United Nations, citizens of the United States held a disproportionate share of positions in
the Secretariat|from 20-25% of all senior positions in the 1950s. A factor contributing to
this was that the location of headquarters in New York made it far more dicult to recruit
nationals of other countries.11
A second widely observed anecdote in early stang decisions was that many nations had a
scarcity of individuals with sucient education and experience to able to ll a senior position
at the United Nations. Governments were often invited to recommend their nationals for
senior positions, but declined to do so on the grounds that they did not have capable sta
11It would be incorrect to view this as a historical accident; the locating of U.N. headquarters in New York
occurred because of the United States' position as the dominant world power; the location of main oces of
U.N. agencies is one way in which nations exert inuence over the organization.
15to spare.
The main criteria for sta selection, as inscribed in the Charter, are \eciency, compe-
tence, and integrity," with an equitable geographic distribution being a secondary factor.
Our data do not allow us to see the caliber of individual bureaucrats in the Secretariat.
However, we can to some extent control for the pool of available candidates from each coun-
try with country-level measures that proxy for the sta selection criteria. To proxy for
eciency and competence, we use a measure of human capital, or the number of people with
tertiary education (often a prerequisite for employment at the United Nations). To proxy
for integrity, we use the freedom from corruption measure from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011). The latter is motivated by Fisman and Miguel (2007),
who found that U.N. diplomats' law abidance in New York was correlated with the corrup-
tion level in their home countries. Finally, we include the assessment of dues, given its key
role in the desirable representation formulae.
Our model takes the form:
Yit = 0 + 1  POPULATIONit + 2  EDUCit + 3  CORRUPTIONit + 4  DUESit + Xit + it,
(1)
Where Yit is a measure of representation, POPULATION, EDUC, CORRUPTION and
DUES reect the stang mandate of the United Nations, and Xit is a vector of additional
factors that we would like to test, which are wealth (GDP per capita), traditional interna-
tional power (military spending), diplomacy (as proxied by the number of embassies run by
countries), and democracy.
A desirable empirical specication should have two main characteristics. First, all pre-
dictive factors should be treated as zero sum, since the share of Secretariat positions is
also zero sum. In other words, increasing a country's population by 10% should not af-
fect our prediction of that country's representation if the population of all other countries
has also increased by the same 10%. To achieve this, we rescale all observations on Secre-
16tariat positions, population, assessments of dues, human capital stock, military spending and
diplomatic contacts to convert these to shares of the world total of each value. For instance,
instead of gross military spending, we use share of global military spending. The remaining
variables (democracy, freedom from corruption, GDP per capita) do not have a notion of a
\global total;" to make these zero sum, we rescale them so that observations each year have
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of both
untransformed and transformed variables.
Second, we need to control for the fact that many of the national variables we describe
exhibit signicant serial correlation, as do positions in the Secretariat, since they are often
held for multiple years. To avoid overcounting highly similar observations, we cluster our
standard errors by country in our time series regressions, and by decade in our country xed
eect regressions.
4 Who Runs the United Nations?
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 shows the excess representation of the United States, Germany, Russia, China, and
Japan. As discussed above, the United States had a disproportionate share of positions at
the inception of the United Nations, a share which fell signicantly but then stabilized in
the 1980s. Japan and Germany had little representation following the end of the second
world war, but have steadily risen in prominence, surpassing the United States in excess
representation by the 1980s.12 The Soviet Union was almost never overrepresented at the
United Nations, in part because of Stalin's signicant eorts to undermine the institution
in the early years (Finger, 1975). The fall of the Soviet Union led to a further drop in
12This timing coincides with Japan's \internationalization" policies during the Nakasone administration,
which aimed to increase Japan's role in global aairs (George, 1993).
17Russia's inuence in the Secretariat. China has been and continues to be dramatically
underrepresented in the U.N. Secretariat|with an average over all years of only 1% of
senior positions in the Secretariat.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 shows the world population share and share of U.N. Secretariat positions of
the Western European powers and their oshoots Canada, the United States, New Zealand,
and Australia. While the Western countries' share of world population and GDP have been
steadily declining since the 1960s, their control over the U.N. Secretariat has been largely
unmitigated; in 2007 they continued to hold 45% of Secretariat positions, while their world
population share has fallen from 18% to 12%. This graph shows that in spite of the widely
discussed rise to international prominence of middle income nations like the BRICs, Western
Europe and its oshoots have not lost control over this key U.N. body.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 displays scatterplots of the share of positions in the Secretariat against log
population and log assessment.13 There is a clear upward sloping relationship in both graphs,
but many countries are far from the 45 degree line. The R2 measure for the regression of
Secretariat share on population share is 0.11, while for representation on assessment of dues
it is 0.70. In the bivariate analysis, payment of dues appears to be a much better indicator
of power in the Secretariat than population.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Table 2 presents excess representation in the Secretariat, by country, averaged over all
years.14 Excess representation is dened as the ratio of a country's share of Secretariat
positions to its share of world population, and is proportional to a country's vertical distance
13We use logs on the X axis to display small and large countries on the same graph. We must then use a
log scale for the Y axis in order for the 45 degree line (which indicates a notion of \equal" representation)
to be straight.
14Appendix Table A1 lists countries ranked by their total number of senior Secretariat positions, without
taking population into account.
18from the 45 degree line in the top panel of Figure 4. Nordic countries dominate the list,
occupying 4 of the top 6 positions. Since 1950, Sweden has had on average 0.1% of world
population and 0.8% of world GDP, but has held 4.3% of senior positions in the Secretariat,
including a Secretary-General from 1953-61.15 Western nations are also overrepresented,
with the United States, Canada, and Great Britain all overrepresented by a factor of 2 or
greater. Large, poor nations are signicantly underrepresented; India, China, and Indonesia
each have a world population share four or more times greater than their Secretariat position
share.
[Table 2 about here.]
The high ranks of the Nordic countries are worth examining further. First, we note that
the top six countries by representation are all small democracies. This is consistent with lit-
erature on small, open economies which nds that they take on additional insurance against
negative shocks given their dependence on outside factors. These countries tend to have
democratic corporatist relationships between business and labor (Katzenstein, 1985), larger
governments (Rodrik, 2014), and strategic investments in security-focused international or-
ganizations (Mosser, 2000). That small, open economies would seek a greater role at the
United Nations should is thus not surprising: investing in international institutions may be
their best route to global inuence.
Second, there may be a global perception that Nordic bureaucrats can be trusted to
behave honestly and fairly.16 The high incidence of Nordic countries thus may not be the
result of an exertion of power on their part, but a consequence of their fairness and reliability.
15These measures are not weighted by the expert measures of position importance, so we treat the SG
equally to all other senior positions. Using the importance-weighted measures does not substantively change
the list.
16Indeed, this has been a common reaction to presentations of this paper. It is also consistent with
international surveys. Four of the top ve countries by secretariat representation are among the 10 least
corrupt according to Transparency International (2006). Bureaucrats from these countries appear well-
behaved as well, at least by the Fisman and Miguel (2007) measure: 9 of the top 10 countries by secretariat
representation are among the 20 countries with the fewest parking tickets per diplomat.
19Nevertheless, nding themselves well represented in these senior positions gives the Nordic
countries an opportunity to exercise power over international institutions; they may nd it
to their benet to continue to cultivate a reputation for impartiality. After all, the ability
to shape the preferences of other nations is one of the faces of power (Barnett and Duvall,
2005; Lukes, 1974); the other nations may not even realize the power they have bestowed on
the Nordics.
4.2 Evaluating the Stang Mandate
Table 3 presents estimates from a time series regression of annual Secretariat representation
on population, human capital, freedom from corruption, and assessment of dues to the
United Nations as described by Equation 1. An observation is a country-year, and standard
errors are clustered at the country level. Columns 1 through 4 add independent variables
sequentially. Column 5 repeats the estimation with all variables included, but rather than a
count of senior positions, the outcome variable weights each position by the importance of
that position, as judged by a third party expert. This last measure is rescaled so the total
number of positions remains unity.
[Table 3 about here.]
The rst row further weakens perceptions of the United Nations as a global democracy.
The coecient on population is insignicant across all four columns. Human capital enters
positively with statistical signicance. A 1 percentage point increase in a nation's share of
the global stock of people with tertiary education is associated with a 0.2 to 0.4 percentage
point increase in representation in the Secretariat.17 The freedom from corruption indicator
17One might be worried that our proxy of candidate qualication with tertiary education does not ad-
equately take into account quality dierences in education across countries. (We thank Michael Clemens
for this suggestion.) The best measure of quality dierentials is the OECD^ as Program for International
Student Assessment (PISA) testing of 15-year olds, rst performed in 2000 in 32 countries; the 2012 tests
included 65 countries. While the results cannot be applied to much of our sample given the short history
of testing and narrowness of the sample, it is not obvious anecdotally that we have a large omission. Some
of the best testing countries in 2012 like Singapore, Japan, and Vietnam are noticeably absent from the
20is also positive and signicant in all specications: countries with low corruption and good
governance are better represented in the Secretariat. Assessment of dues also enters posi-
tively and signicantly. Column 5 indicates that these results are robust to using importance
weighted measures of Secretariat representation.
The results lend weight to the importance of the stang mandate of the United Nations,
suggesting that the supply of individuals of high competence and integrity plays a key role
in the composition of the U.N. Secretariat, as does the assessment of dues.
The analysis thus far uses both cross-sectional and time series variation in representation.
Table 4 presents estimates from a model with country xed eects, and thus controls for
any unobserved country-level variables (but also eliminates the interesting variation between
countries). The results on population, assessment of dues and human capital are sustained;
the eect of corruption is not visible in the time series alone, likely because it is available
for only a third of the years and does not change signicantly over time.
[Table 4 about here.]
We now examine the role of factors beyond the ocial stang mandate of the United
Nations.
4.3 Factors Beyond the Stang Mandate
Table 5 shows the relationship between Secretariat representation and per capita wealth,
military spending, investment in diplomacy, and democracy, controlling for the variables
used in the stang mandate regressions above. Human capital, military expenditure, GDP
and assessment of dues are all highly colinear, which makes it dicult to separate their
individual eects.18 Columns 1 through 3 show that these variables are positive, signicant
top ranks in U.N. Secretariat. Conversely, among the ten most over-represented countries in the Secretariat
(Table 2) only third-ranked Finland is a top-ten education quality performer in the much smaller sample of
PISA-scoring countries.
18The correlation coecients are GDP;dues = 0:98; dues;tertiaryed = 0:92; dues;militaryshare =
0:89; militaryshare;tertiaryed = 0:84. Note that the per capita measures are less highly correlated, but as
21and very similar in magnitude when included separately.
Diplomacy enters with positive and highly signicant point estimates, suggesting that
investment in soft power is a key factor in determining representation in the U.N. Secretariat.
A 1 percentage point increase in a country's share of the world's embassies is associated with
a 0.5 to 0.7 percentage point increase in Secretariat representation.
Democracy and wealth are also positively correlated with representation, but not signif-
icant in all specications.19
[Table 5 about here.]
When assessment, human capital stock and military spending are included together (col-
umn 4), the education variable dominates, but we are reluctant to infer too much from this
since it is based on a small amount of variation between these three measures.20 When
xed eects are included (Appendix Table A2), results are upheld for all variables except
diplomacy, which does not change signicantly over time.21
Table 6 shows how the correlates of U.N. Secretariat representation have changed over
time, by estimating the main specication separately for each decade. Estimates are noisier
due to the smaller sample sizes, but we nd that diplomacy has a consistent and large
eect over time. Population and freedom from corruption are insignicant in all decades.
With the same qualication about multicollinearity as above, among assessment (GDP),
human capital, and military spending, we nd that human capital is more important in the
1970s and 1980s while assessment plays a larger role in the 1990s and 2000s. Meanwhile,
democracy wanes in importance while wealth rises in importance. Taken together, these
described above the gross measures are more appropriate to our specication.
19As above, results are robust to the use of the weighted representation measure, as well as to the exclusion
of the United States. These tables are available upon request from the authors.
20We chose to use the military expenditure measure rather than the widely used Composite Index of
National Capability (CINC) because the latter already includes several variables that are identical or very
highly correlated with population and GDP, which we wish to control for separately. However, our results
are robust to the use of CINC in place of military expenditure share and available upon request.
21Country xed eects explain 89% of the variation in diplomatic contacts.
22results are consistent with the notion that the sta were initially drawn more from educated
democracies, but as global education and governance levels have risen over time, economic
strength has played a larger role.
[Table 6 about here.]
5 Extension: Power, Alliances, and the Pax Ameri-
cana
In the struggle to control international institutions, as in military matters, alliances are
important. Consider the campaign to prevent global warming. Countries form coalitions to
advance their shared interests. This suggests we may have a problem of measurement error
if we restrict our attention to a country's own representation in an international organization
and ignore the combined power of its alliance. Palau, for instance, might be equally satised
between holding a Secretariat position itself or having Maldives hold a position, since both
low-lying island nations share the same goal of preventing climate change. The United States
might be content to have Canadians and New Zealanders sta the peacekeeping department,
since their outlook, strategy, and judgment would likely be similar to their own.
We can extend our analysis by taking alliances, or shared preferences, into account. We
use the term alliance loosely, recognizing that our statistical measures can only serve as im-
perfect proxies for true underlying alliances or coalitions. In this section we will augment the
basic count of Secretariat positions with an alliance-weighted measure. As a demonstration
of the potential to use Secretariat stang as a measure of power, we consider the case of the
United States.
One of the most public debates in the eld of power and international relations is whether
the United States' power is in decline. As Joseph Nye wrote in, \The Decline and Fall of
America's Decline and Fall" (2011a), America's decline has been frequently anticipated:
23rst the Soviets in the 1950s and 1960s, then the Japanese in the 1980s, and now the
Chinese have all been predicted to \get the better of America." Taking the long view,
Paul Kennedy had predicted decline (1989) but even by 2012 many prominent writers were
unconvinced (Kagan, 2012; Lieber, 2012). A parallel, and sometimes overlapping debate has
been occurring on whether we are in an era of \American Empire" (Nexon and Wright, 2007).
The breadth of opinions leaves open the question of whether America's power is in decline,
uctuating, or indeed in ascent. Our measure of Secretariat representation oers an objective
and consistent methodology for contributing to this debate.
As Figure 2 depicts, the United States was signicantly overrepresented in the early years
of the United Nations' existence. Its share of positions declined steadily until around 1980,
and has since remained relatively constant and modest. At rst glance this appears to be a
fall in institutional power from 1950 through 1980, as other nations, notably Germany and
Japan in the gure, increased in prominence. This is consistent with the Kennedy view.
However, this raw scoring ignores the fact that the United States structured the interna-
tional system after W.W.II to help enforce the so-called Pax Americana. With the United
Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations, the United States, wrote John Ikenberry,
\spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated
economic and security order" (Ikenberry, 2001). The plan may never have been to dominate
the individual institutions once they matured but rather to share them with other nations
who subscribed to the American worldview. We must thus consider the possibility that
U.S. allies might have held, or gained ground, in the Secretariat even as the United States'
individual representation has fallen, as suggested by the steady share of positions held by
Western countries, visible in Figure 3. If these countries' international bureaucrats share
American objectives and preferences, then it may be that the interests of the United States
are no less represented in the international system than they were in 1960 when U.S. sta
representation was at its peak.
24While this view seems plausible for the Cold War years, the notion of a \Western Eu-
rope and oshoot" alliance in recent international aairs is less obvious. The United States
often has signicant disagreement with European countries in matters of international orga-
nization, with Americans becoming increasingly unilateralist and Europeans multilateralists
(Rubenfeld, 2004). Our data can shed light on these issues.
5.1 Alliance-Weighted Representation
Taking alliances into account allows us to more comprehensively answer the question of
whether the United States is in decline, by examining whether closely allied nations have
acquired the positions that America has lost.
Measuring alliances as they relate to the multifaceted job of running the United Nations
is not easy. Restricting our attention to data that could be analyzed in panel form, we
could use several possible proxies|any of which could be used in the methodology that we
describe below. We elect to proxy preference similarity by focusing on U.N. voting records,
as we think it comes the closest to measuring the relevant dimension of alliances for the
management of the Secretariat. We repeated the exercise below using common membership
in intergovernmental organizations (Pevehouse et al., 2004) as another measure of alliance,
with broadly similar results.22 Other possible variables, such as formal military alliances or
international public opinion data could also be used.
We use U.N. General Assembly voting data (Gartzke, 2006) to generate a unique, dy-
namic, and synthetic alliance for any country. The assumption behind our formulation is
that bureaucrats from two countries with identical preferences over General Assembly resolu-
tions will behave in the same manner if given senior positions in the Secretariat. Alternately,
one country has just as much alliance-weighted representation when its close ally holds a
position as when the country itself does. Pairs of countries with weaker correlations in voting
22Results available from the authors upon request.
25behavior receive correspondingly less benet from each others' positions.
We model country j's alliance-weighted inuence as:
INFLUENCEj;t =
X
i2I
POSITIONSi;t  AFFINITYi;j;t, (2)
where POSITIONSi;t is the share of positions held by country i at time t and AFFINITYi;j;t
is a measure of the similarity of voting in the General Assembly between countries i and
j in year t, with AFFINITYi;i;t = 1. Specically, for any given year, AFFINITYi;j =
1 2 d
dmax, where d is the number of times that i votes against j, and dmax is the number of
General Assembly votes.23 In words, a country j's alliance-weighted inuence is a weighted
average of the inuence of all countries in the world, where the weighting is determined by
how much country j votes like the other countries.
This alliance-weighted measure is slightly unrealistic as an indicator of national power
in that it describes a small country and a large country with very similar voting records
(Iceland and Sweden, for example) as being equally powerful. Surely, Sweden exerts more
control over the United Nations than Iceland. Yet from the perspective of an individual
Swede or Icelander, there is no dierence in terms of whether one country or the other is
exercising agency at the U.N.. Moreover, to capture the dierence between Iceland and
Sweden here, it would suce to look at each country's raw representation in tandem with
their alliance-weighted representation.
The other concern with our approach is that General Assembly voting might not be
an adequate measure of the dierence between two countries' preferences. There are some
documented weaknesses in such use of the data but it is nonetheless the methodology of
choice in dozens of papers in political science and economics (Voeten, 2013). For those
scholars who would prefer a dierent dyadic measure of preference similarity, that variable
23AFFINITY and INFLUENCE are thus both bounded between -1 and 1.
26could be substituted for AFFINITY in equation 2.
Dening the United States as \country j," the solid lines in Figure 5 show U.S. inuence in
the Secretariat over time (black), along with the unadjusted U.S. Secretariat representation
measure from (gray) Figure 2. The measures track each other until the mid-1960s. From
1965 to 1980, the number of positions held by Americans declines, but America's alliance-
weighted representation remains constant, as those positions are lled by American allies.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Around 1980, U.S. alliance-weighted inuence falls in the Secretariat and drops below
zero, indicating that the average senior ocial in the Secretariat is from a nation that is an
opponent of the U.S. rather than an ally. From 1981 to 2007, Secretariat anity with the
U.S. remains largely negative, with a slight upturn during the Clinton administration and a
monotonic fall during the subsequent Bush years.
These changes in alliance-weighted representation could be driven by either a change in
composition of the Secretariat or a change in General Assembly voting behavior of countries.
In other words, a country loses inuence when (i) it or its allies lose Secretariat positions; or
(ii) countries that already have positions become more opposed to the country in question.
We can test between these two alternatives by examining a hypothetical scenario where
alliances have not changed since the 1950s. This scenario is represented by the dashed
line in Figure 5. When we hold alliances constant, the U.S. decline is almost completely
eliminated, indicating that all of the lost American positions were taken by its 1950s allies,
but that these allies no longer share ideology with the United States.
This exercise suggests that U.S. inuence in the United Nations has signicantly waned
over time, such that the Secretariat is no longer a projection of U.S. power. The mecha-
nisms behind this nding are nevertheless consistent with the idea that the characteristics
of international organizations persist beyond the conditions of their origination (Keohane,
1984; Ikenberry, 2001). But this is not to say that the balance of power in those organiza-
27tions is static; the Secretariat is as pro-Western as ever, but the main beneciaries are the
former allies of the United States rather than America itself. In assisting in the creation
of an organization that would be dominated by the West rather than dominated Amer-
ica (Ikenberry, 2001), the United States in the 1940s may have constrained its own future
administrations to be more Wilsonian than they would otherwise be.
5.2 Measuring Institutional Bias
We have shown a secular decline in U.S. power as expressed by the stang of the Secretariat
from 1950 to the present. It remains possible that the Secretariat has a pro-U.S. bias relative
to the world, even while the inuence measure of the United States is negative. In other
words, a U.N. Secretariat that is opposed to the United States might be even more opposed
to the United States if it represented all countries equally.
We extend our methodology to measure the international bias of an institution, dened
as the dierence between the institution-country anity measure and a population-weighted
measure of the world's anity for the country.24
First, we create a variable analogous to INFLUENCE above but instead of weighting
with Secretariat positions, we weight with world population. This gives us a population-
weighted measure of the anity of the world for a given country:
OPINIONUSA;t =
X
i2I
POPULATIONi;t  AFFINITYi;USA;t, (3)
where POPULATIONi;t is country i's share of world population at time t. This measure
describes what the variable INFLUENCE would be if the nationality distribution in the
24The use of population weights implies that our reference point is a situation where all people in the
world are represented equally. Our premise is that any departure from such a point is a reection of national
inuence over the Secretariat, which is exactly what we want to measure. If we were to use a residual
from one of the regressions in the previous section, we would be omitting the eect on power of any of the
regression variables in the analysis.
28Secretariat matched that of the world. We then dene the bias of an institution|in our case
the U.N. Secretariat|toward the views of a country as the dierence between the country's
anity with the institution and the country's anity with the world:
BIASUSA;t = INFLUENCEUSA;t   OPINIONUSA;t: (4)
We plot BIAS for the United States over time in Figure 6. The gure shows that relative to
the world as a whole, the U.N. Secretariat has been consistently biased toward the United
States. If the stang of the Secretariat were proportional to national populations, the United
States would have even less inuence over the institution. In other words, despite increased
U.S. isolation (as expressed by voting in the General Assembly), the United States benets
from a relatively friendly Secretariat. The U.S. has lost inuence in the U.N. Secretariat
since 1980, but it has fallen even further in the eyes of the world. The Pax Americana seems
to benet the United States after all.
[Figure 6 about here.]
This methodology can be used to examine the bias of any international organization,
given data on the nationalities of key ocials. As an example, we analyze the bureaucratic
leadership of the United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UN-
ESCO) during the 1970s and early 1980s. This U.N. specialized agency was only the second
U.N. agency from which the United States withdrew, in 198425 (Joyner and Lawson, 1986).
UNESCO's General Conference regularly adopted anti-Israel resolutions, sponsored disar-
mament activities that the Americans thought were biased in favor of Soviet positions, and
promoted restrictions on the freedom of the press through the controversial New World Infor-
mation and Communication Order (NWICO) (Jacobson, 1984; Puchala, 1990). UNESCO's
Secretariat played a decisive role in the organization's stance and direction (Joyner and Law-
25The U.S. withdrew from the International Labor Organization from 1978-80.
29son, 1986). In Figure 7 we compute UNESCO's pro-U.S. bias and compare it with the U.N.
Secretariat through 1988, the last year for which we have leadership data on UNESCO. As
can be seen in the gure, UNESCO is notably less pro-American than the Secretariat. This
imbalance would be signicantly greater if not for a single directorship held by the United
States for most of this period, a position which likely played a role in scuttling the NWICO
eort.
[Figure 7 about here.]
6 Conclusion
In 1946, Norwegian Trygve Lie was made the rst Secretary General of the United Nations,
in part because of the strong Soviet opinion that the position should go to someone who was
neither British, French, nor American (Thant and Scott, 2007). The Nordic countries have
since continued to dominate the senior ranks of the United Nations, perhaps in part because
their citizens are perceived as neutral and trustworthy. Whatever the reason, it is perhaps
no accident that the bureaucratic arms of the United Nations tend toward an ideology that
is not dissilimar to that of the Nordic nations. To the extent that international institutions
constrain the actions of states, the Nordic countries are in a far more inuential international
position than their economic or military strength would suggest.
We have argued that countries with greater ability to inuence international organizations
will be more successful in placing their nationals into senior positions, and that this is an
increasingly important aspect of state power. Since these positions are scarce and central
to the operation of the United Nations, the resulting allocation of senior positions gives us
information on countries' ability to compete for inuence in the international system. In spite
of the modesty of its setting, this measure of power has some advantages over traditional
capability-based measures.
30We nd that democracies, countries that invest in bilateral diplomacy, and economi-
cally/militarily powerful countries are the most eective at placing sta in the Secretariat|
even after controlling for monetary contributions to the U.N. and the stang mandate of
competence and integrity. This suggests that exercising inuence via a multilateral insti-
tution is a complement to exercising it through traditional bilateral diplomacy. Examining
our measure over time, we nd that Western Europe and its oshoots have retained control
over a disproportionate share of positions in the Secretariat, even while their share of global
GDP and population has fallen.
Going further, we put forward a measure of representation that takes shared preferences
between countries into account. We examine the alliance-weighted representation of the
United States and nd that American inuence has been in decline since the formation of
the United Nations, especially since 1980, and that the growing ideological distance between
the United States and its 1950 allies plays an important role in this decline. However, the
Secretariat remains weakly biased toward the interests of the United States, when compared
with the interests of the world as a whole.
This paper is not a conclusive operationalization of power, or a comprehensive answer
to the question of who runs the world. Rather, it attempts to plumb the rich information
hidden in plain sight, which is the national composition of the senior sta of the world's
most global institution. This information oers a quantiable approach to help understand
how nations interact in a globalized context.
31Table 1
Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N
Number of senior Secretariat positions 0.4 1.0 0.0 11.0 8933
Share of senior Secretariat positions 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.28 8933
GDP (million USD) 128,862 640,398 30 13,983,709 6120
GDP share 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.45 6120
Population (millions) 29.9 103.5 0.1 1,311.0 8519
Population share 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.23 8519
Population with higher ed (million) 0.72 3.11 0.00 56.16 7338
Human capital share 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.43 7338
Inverse corruption index -0.1 1.0 -2.2 2.6 1198
Inverse corruption (rescaled) 0.0 1.0 -2.0 2.7 1198
UN Fee Assessment 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.33 6120
Military expenditure (thousand USD) 4,510 24,619 0 552,568 6732
Military spending share 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.52 6732
Democracy (Polity) 0.3 7.5 -10.0 10.0 6857
Democracy (Polity, rescaled) -0.0 1.0 -2.2 1.7 6857
GDP Per Capita 3,789 7,649 38 82,020 6120
GDP Per Capita (rescaled) -0.0 1.0 -0.9 6.0 6120
Diplomatic contacts 36 29 0 156 6080
Diplomatic contacts (share) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 6080
32Table 2
Secretariat representation, all years, excess over population
Rank Country Share of positions Share of world population Excess Representation
1 Sweden 0.0428 0.0015 21.67
2 Norway 0.0180 0.0007 18.69
3 Finland 0.0206 0.0009 17.90
4 New Zealand 0.0114 0.0006 15.97
5 Ireland 0.0109 0.0006 13.67
6 Denmark 0.0150 0.0009 12.43
7 Panama 0.0050 0.0005 11.68
8 Jamaica 0.0047 0.0004 9.72
9 Switzerland 0.0118 0.0012 7.93
10 Uruguay 0.0053 0.0005 7.68
11 Sierra Leone 0.0056 0.0007 7.44
12 Jordan 0.0037 0.0008 7.27
13 Canada 0.0382 0.0051 6.93
14 Ghana 0.0178 0.0032 6.75
15 Botswana 0.0015 0.0003 6.63
16 Greece 0.0149 0.0018 6.62
17 Chile 0.0161 0.0025 6.38
18 Austria 0.0117 0.0013 6.38
19 Tunisia 0.0083 0.0016 5.70
20 Senegal 0.0068 0.0016 5.27
22 Australia 0.0150 0.0031 4.55
24 United Kingdom 0.0581 0.0097 4.28
29 Argentina 0.0224 0.0061 3.49
36 France 0.0343 0.0097 2.72
38 United States 0.1292 0.0464 2.46
44 Italy 0.0264 0.0094 2.00
46 Egypt 0.0173 0.0115 1.70
51 Colombia 0.0082 0.0065 1.39
52 Pakistan 0.0259 0.0227 1.37
53 Poland 0.0100 0.0063 1.23
56 Myanmar 0.0085 0.0077 1.14
62 South Africa 0.0060 0.0072 0.95
63 Germany 0.0158 0.0135 0.84
64 Iran 0.0072 0.0105 0.82
66 Philippines 0.0085 0.0128 0.79
67 Japan 0.0206 0.0208 0.78
68 Nigeria 0.0131 0.0205 0.78
69 Russian Federation 0.0237 0.0240 0.74
75 Sudan 0.0030 0.0057 0.66
76 Tanzania 0.0029 0.0056 0.66
78 Mexico 0.0091 0.0161 0.63
81 Spain 0.0048 0.0066 0.57
83 Brazil 0.0131 0.0286 0.49
85 Turkey 0.0045 0.0109 0.44
86 Korea, Rep. 0.0034 0.0077 0.42
89 India 0.0447 0.1670 0.29
90 Indonesia 0.0055 0.0337 0.17
91 Bangladesh 0.0032 0.0231 0.16
92 Thailand 0.0008 0.0102 0.08
94 Ethiopia 0.0005 0.0108 0.05
95 China 0.0086 0.2075 0.04
96 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.0000 0.0084 0.00
96 Romania 0.0000 0.0037 0.00
96 Ukraine 0.0000 0.0081 0.00
96 Vietnam 0.0000 0.0128 0.00
33Table 3
Correlates of U.N. Secretariat representation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population share 0.211 -0.005 0.011 0.018 0.008
(0.141) (0.065) (0.069) (0.077) (0.075)
Human capital share 0.398 0.370 0.168 0.229
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.110) (0.089)**
Inverse corruption (rescaled) 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
UN Fee Assessment 0.259 0.217
(0.142)* (0.115)*
Constant 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
N 8519 7306 7170 5464 5464
r2 0.08 0.47 0.52 0.55 0.57
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
The table shows coecients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in the United Nations
Secretariat as the dependent variable. Each observation is a country-year. Columns 1 through 4 add covariates
sequentially. The dependent variable in column 5 is the share of weighted secretariat representation, with
weights equal to expert rankings of the important of each position. Population, human capital and assessment
of dues are represented as world shares. The freedom from corruption index is rescaled to have a mean of 0
and standard deviation of 1 in each year. Standard errors are clustered by country.
34Table 4
Correlates of U.N. Secretariat representation (Country Fixed Eects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population share 0.835 -0.043 -0.021 0.524 0.402
(0.719) (0.555) (0.564) (0.581) (0.534)
Human capital share 0.594 0.621 0.405 0.474
(0.137)*** (0.140)*** (0.118)*** (0.115)***
Inverse corruption (rescaled) 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
UN Fee Assessment 0.509 0.473
(0.127)*** (0.109)***
N 8519 7306 7170 5464 5464
r2 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.73
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
The table shows coecients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in the United
Nations Secretariat as the dependent variable, and country xed eects. Each observation is a country-
year. Columns 1 through 4 add covariates sequentially. The dependent variable in column 5 is the share
of weighted secretariat representation, with weights equal to expert rankings of the important of each
position. Population, human capital and assessment of dues are represented as world shares. The freedom
from corruption index is rescaled to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 in each year. Standard
errors are clustered by country-decade pairs.
35Table 5
Additional Correlates of U.N. Secretariat Representation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population share -0.009 0.039 0.029 -0.007
(0.054) (0.066) (0.075) (0.056)
Human capital share 0.259 0.239
(0.017)*** (0.073)***
UN Fee Assessment 0.289 0.011
(0.058)*** (0.088)
Military spending share 0.217 0.012
(0.018)*** (0.051)
Inverse corruption (rescaled) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Per Capita (rescaled) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*
Diplomatic contacts (share) 0.676 0.529 0.761 0.667
(0.163)*** (0.157)*** (0.169)*** (0.159)***
Democracy (Polity, rescaled) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 4615 5023 4937 4552
r2 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.53
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
The table shows coecients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in
the United Nations Secretariat as the dependent variable. Each observation is a country-
year. Columns 1 through 3 separately include the highly colinear Assessment of Dues, Share
of Tertiary Educated Population and Share of Military Spending. Column 4 adds a control
for share of all UN secretariat sta (i.e. not only senior), a variable which we have for only
2008. Column 5 includes the three colinear controls together. Population, human capital,
assessment of dues, diplomatic contacts and military spending are represented as world shares.
The freedom from corruption index, Polity score and per capita wealth are rescaled to have a
mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 in each year. Standard errors are clustered by country.
36Table 6
Coecients on Secretariat Representation Over Time
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Population share 1.255 0.303 0.540 0.464 0.356
(0.411)*** (0.162)* (0.146)*** (0.255)* (0.287)
Population Share2 -6.333 -1.640 -2.238 -2.138 -1.767
(1.921)*** (0.744)** (0.653)*** (1.109)* (1.360)
Human capital share -0.330 0.400 0.131 -0.068 -0.083
(0.258) (0.088)*** (0.121) (0.132) (0.139)
Inverse corruption (rescaled) -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*
UN Fee Assessment -0.039 -0.385 -0.057 0.164 0.249
(0.219) (0.063)*** (0.087) (0.065)** (0.103)**
GDP Per Capita (rescaled) 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.003)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)** (0.002)
Military spending share 0.658 0.173 0.014 0.033 0.026
(0.281)** (0.108) (0.072) (0.081) (0.045)
Diplomatic contacts (share) 0.094 0.733 0.287 0.577 0.466
(0.271) (0.219)*** (0.205) (0.219)*** (0.211)**
Democracy (Polity, rescaled) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)* (0.001) (0.001)
N 712 927 974 1117 822
r2 0.73 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.58
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
The table shows coecients from estimation of Equation 1, with the share of positions in the United Nations
Secretariat as the dependent variable, and the sample split by decade. Each observation is a country-year.
Population, human capital, assessment of dues, diplomatic contacts and military spending are represented
as world shares. The freedom from corruption index, Polity score and per capita wealth are rescaled to have
a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 in each year. Standard errors are clustered by country.
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Number of positions listed and identied in U.N. Yearbook
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The gure shows the number of positions listed in the Appendix of the U.N. Yearbook, \Key
Sta of the U.N. Secretariat," along with the number of those position-holders that were
matched to nationalities. Our main measure of representation is the share of positions held
by each nation in a given year.
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Secretariat Representation of World Powers Over Time
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The gure shows annual excess representation in the United Nations Secretariat of selected
world powers over time. The y axis is excess representation, dened as a country's share of
senior Secretariat positions divided by a country's share of world population.
39Figure 3
Secretariat and Population Share of Western Europe and Oshoots
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The gure shows, over time, the share of senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat
held by Western Europe and its oshoots (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand),
and the world population share of these same powers.
40Figure 4
Secretariat representation vs. population and GDP
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The top panel of the gure shows a scatter plot of the average share of secretariat positions held across
all years against the average population of a country in all years. The solid line is not a best t, but a 45
degree line. Countries above the line are overrepresented in the secretariat relative to their population, while
countries below the solid line are underrepresented. The bottom panel of the gure shows the same plot,
but with assessment of dues to the United Nations on the X axis. For readability, the graphs are presented
on logarithmic scales, and the sample is limited to all countries with population greater than 20 million, as
well as the 20 most countries with the most senior positions in the Secretariat.
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Secretariat anity for USA
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The gure shows how U.S. inuence over the United Nations Secretariat (or anity
between the Secretariat and the United States) has changed over time. The solid gray line
(right axis) shows the share of senior positions in the Secretariat held by Americans. The
solid black line (left axis) describes American inuence over the Secretariat, as dened by
Equation 2. The dashed black line (left axis) describes what American inuence over the
Secretariat would look like if the anity between nations remained xed at its 1950 level.
The anity measures are based on voting in the U.N. General Assembly.
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Secretariat bias toward USA
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The graph shows the extent to which the stang of the U.N. Secretariat is biased toward
the United States. The y axis measures the dierence in each year between the anity of
the world for the United States (based on population weighting) and the anity of the U.N.
Secretariat (based on sta positions) for the United States.
43Figure 7
U.S. Bias of UNESCO and Secretariat
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The graph shows the extent to which the stang of UNESCO is biased toward the United
States. The y axis measures the dierence in each year between the anity of the world for
the United States (based on population weighting) and the anity of UNESCO (based on
sta positions) for the United States.
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49A Appendix
Table A1
Secretariat representation, average share over all years
Rank Country Share of positions
1 United States 0.1292
2 United Kingdom 0.0581
3 India 0.0447
4 Sweden 0.0428
5 Canada 0.0382
6 France 0.0343
7 Italy 0.0264
8 Pakistan 0.0259
9 Russian Federation 0.0237
10 Argentina 0.0224
12 Finland 0.0206
13 Japan 0.0206
14 Norway 0.0180
15 Ghana 0.0178
16 Egypt 0.0173
17 Chile 0.0161
18 Germany 0.0158
19 Australia 0.0150
20 Denmark 0.0150
21 Greece 0.0149
22 Netherlands 0.0146
23 Nigeria 0.0131
24 Brazil 0.0131
25 Sri Lanka 0.0125
26 Taiwan 0.0122
27 Switzerland 0.0118
28 Austria 0.0117
29 New Zealand 0.0114
30 Ireland 0.0109
31 Poland 0.0100
32 Mexico 0.0091
33 Peru 0.0091
34 China 0.0086
35 Philippines 0.0085
36 Myanmar 0.0085
37 Tunisia 0.0083
50Table A1
Secretariat representation, average share over all years
Rank Country Share of positions
38 Colombia 0.0082
39 Iran 0.0072
40 Algeria 0.0071
41 Belgium 0.0070
42 Senegal 0.0068
43 Czech Republic 0.0067
44 Venezuela 0.0065
45 South Africa 0.0060
46 Sierra Leone 0.0056
47 Cameroon 0.0055
48 Indonesia 0.0055
49 Uruguay 0.0053
50 Burundi 0.0052
51 Panama 0.0050
52 Niger 0.0050
53 Spain 0.0048
54 Guatemala 0.0048
55 Iraq 0.0047
56 Jamaica 0.0047
57 Somalia 0.0047
58 Turkey 0.0045
59 Jordan 0.0037
60 Ecuador 0.0037
61 Malaysia 0.0036
62 Yemen 0.0035
63 Korea, Rep. 0.0034
64 Bangladesh 0.0032
65 Burkina Faso 0.0032
66 Sudan 0.0030
67 Hungary 0.0029
68 Tanzania 0.0029
69 Nepal 0.0028
70 Haiti 0.0028
71 Costa Rica 0.0021
72 Syria 0.0020
73 Singapore 0.0020
74 Mali 0.0018
75 Uganda 0.0017
51Table A1
Secretariat representation, average share over all years
Rank Country Share of positions
76 Portugal 0.0016
77 Bolivia 0.0015
78 Botswana 0.0015
79 Bulgaria 0.0014
80 Saudi Arabia 0.0013
81 Kenya 0.0012
82 Slovak Republic 0.0012
83 Guinea 0.0012
84 Cuba 0.0012
85 Zimbabwe 0.0011
86 Lebanon 0.0010
87 Namibia 0.0009
88 Liberia 0.0008
89 Thailand 0.0008
90 El Salvador 0.0007
91 Togo 0.0005
92 Ethiopia 0.0005
93 Chad 0.0003
94 Eritrea 0.0003
95 Lesotho 0.0002
96 Mozambique 0.0002
97 Afghanistan 0.0000
97 Angola 0.0000
97 Albania 0.0000
97 United Arab Emirates 0.0000
97 Armenia 0.0000
97 Azerbaijan 0.0000
97 Benin 0.0000
97 Bosnia And Herzegovina 0.0000
97 Belarus 0.0000
97 Central African Republic 0.0000
97 Cote D'Ivoire 0.0000
97 Congo, Rep. 0.0000
97 Dominican Republic 0.0000
97 Estonia 0.0000
97 Georgia 0.0000
97 Honduras 0.0000
97 Croatia 0.0000
52Table A1
Secretariat representation, average share over all years
Rank Country Share of positions
97 Israel 0.0000
97 Kazakhstan 0.0000
97 Kyrgyz Republic 0.0000
97 Cambodia 0.0000
97 Kosovo 0.0000
97 Kuwait 0.0000
97 Laos 0.0000
97 Libya 0.0000
97 Lithuania 0.0000
97 Latvia 0.0000
97 Morocco 0.0000
97 Moldova 0.0000
97 Madagascar 0.0000
97 Macedonia 0.0000
97 Mongolia 0.0000
97 Mauritania 0.0000
97 Malawi 0.0000
97 Nicaragua 0.0000
97 Oman 0.0000
97 Papua New Guinea 0.0000
97 Puerto Rico 0.0000
97 Korea, Dem. Rep. 0.0000
97 Paraguay 0.0000
97 Romania 0.0000
97 Rwanda 0.0000
97 Serbia 0.0000
97 Slovenia 0.0000
97 Tajikistan 0.0000
97 Turkmenistan 0.0000
97 Trinidad And Tobago 0.0000
97 Ukraine 0.0000
97 Uzbekistan 0.0000
97 Vietnam 0.0000
97 West Bank And Gaza 0.0000
97 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.0000
97 Zambia 0.0000
53Table A2
More correlates of U.N. secretariat representation COUNTRY F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population share 0.327 -0.255 0.357 -0.224
(0.898) (1.015) (1.187) (0.884)
Inverse corruption (rescaled) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
GDP Per Capita (rescaled) 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)* (0.003)* (0.002)
Diplomatic contacts (share) 0.250 0.197 0.513 0.166
(0.357) (0.334) (0.496) (0.294)
Democracy (Polity, rescaled) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
UN Fee Assessment 0.494 0.233
(0.238)** (0.160)
Human capital share 0.430 0.383
(0.135)*** (0.186)**
Military spending share 0.080 0.124
(0.034)** (0.100)
Constant 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.005
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
N 5023 4615 4937 4552
r2 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.69
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
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